

# Routes to tour in Germany

## The Green Coast Route

German roads will get you there — wherever people live and there are sights worth seeing. Old churches or half-timbered houses, changing landscapes or townships. There are just too many impressions, so many people find it hard to see at a glance what would suit their personal taste. Which is why we in Germany have laid out well-marked tourist routes concentrating on a special feature. Take the coast. We

are keen Europeans and happy to share the Green Coast Route with the Dutch, Danes and Norwegians. But we do feel that we in the north-west of Germany have the most varied section of the route. Offshore there are the North and East Frisian Islands. Then there are the rivers Elbe, Weser and Ems. There are moors and forests, holiday resorts with all manner of recreational facilities. Spas, castles and museums. And

the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg with their art galleries, theatres and shopping streets. Come and see for yourself the north-west of Germany. The Green Coast Route will be your guide.

- 1 Neuhaarlingslele
- 2 A Frisian farmhouse in the Altes Land
- 3 Bremen
- 4 The North Sea



**DZT** DEUTSCHE ZENTRALE FÜR TOURISMUS EV  
Beethovenstrasse 59, D-6000 Frankfurt/M.

# The German Tribune

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C  
ISSN 0016-8858

Hamburg, 17 April 1983  
Twenty-second year - No. 1080 - By air



## Europe haunted by spectre of nuclear battleground

Frankfurter  
Neue Presse

The possibility of a nuclear war being limited to Europe is a constantly recurring feature of the arms race and disarmament debate.

It is a topic as old as Nato itself. The moment the West joined forces to counter the Eastern threat America's European allies were worried the United States might leave them in the lurch.

They also feared, time and again, that America might be tempted to wage war in Russia in Europe.

The various deterrent doctrines that prevailed in Nato's strategic thinking over the years have been drawn up to make US guarantees appear as credible to the Russians and to America's allies.

Whenever the Americans worked on an overall deterrent many were led by the nose to leave the door open to their own devices to save their own skins.

The emergence of Eurostrategic weapons now presents an opportunity of limiting the spectre of a war limited to Europe.

It is advisable to take a constant look at the probability or likelihood of any such limited engagement.

IN THIS ISSUE

LD AFFAIRS Page 2  
Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov, door, missile compromise has been slammed

LE Page 5  
Gorbachev: the man who almost became Chancellor

CULTURE Page 8  
Battle for the stomachs of the world: grains of wheat on both sides

ETS Page 10  
Digging for water under the barren wastes of the Sahara desert

LAW Page 15  
Lock your doors folks, here comes the Dortmund police force

Now the Russians have taken threatening the Europeans that it will happen if they allow the Americans to offset the advantage the Soviet Union enjoys by virtue of the arms race-up it has already undertaken.

The first question one must ask is whether this limited war might be waged. It extends from the Atlantic to the

Would it be possible to limit fighting to between the Atlantic and the Elbe, as Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov has lately sought to suggest?

It is hardly likely that the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and, above all, the western part of the Soviet Union could be kept out of the action.

Between them they are both Moscow's major allies and the part of the Soviet Union that accounts for a crucial share of Russia's industrial and agricultural potential.

So the Soviet Union would be clearly at a disadvantage if it were to allow a limited war to be waged in Europe that would be sure to weaken Russia decisively.

Right from the first engagement the Soviet Union would need to try to drag the United States into the fray.

America has a substantial military establishment stationed in Europe as an earnest of its guarantees. The United States could not possibly sacrifice US manpower in Europe without hitting an eyelid if the Soviet Union were to try to take Western Europe by surprise.

So both superpowers have every good reason for seeking to avoid a clash in Europe, as 110 years of all people realised shortly before his end.

On being shown impressive film footage about the V 1 and the V 2 he seems to have immediately appreciated the future significance of what were the first long-range missiles.

Once weapons of this kind had been fully developed, he said, it would no longer be possible to fight wars in Europe because there would no longer be enough room.

Moscow, let it be added, is still a part of Europe.

The danger of destabilisation lies elsewhere, in the evident inability of the


Soviet Defence Minister Dimitri Ustinov has threatened Western Europe with nuclear destruction.

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, meeting in Prague, have drawn up a comprehensive catalogue of disarmament offers and bids to reach an understanding.

Both moves have the same aim in mind, that of preventing missile modernisation by Nato and the stationing of new US medium-range missiles in Europe.

Marshall Ustinov was critical of the threat to peace posed by hundreds of American medium-range missiles that were to be based in Western Europe.

He conveniently forgot to note that the real threat to peace (and the arms race the Kremlin claims not to want) is posed by the hundreds of Soviet medium-range missiles Moscow already



## A soldier says goodbye

General Frederick Kroesen, the Supreme Commander of the American land forces in Europe, is retiring. He makes his official goodbye to Germany here to President Karl Carstens in Bonn. General Kroesen, who survived a terrorist assassination attempt in Heidelberg in 1981, is to be succeeded by General Glenn K. Otis. (Photo: AP)

great powers to do without new developments.

The latest news is that both America and Russia are developing new missile systems, and it hardly matters whether they are anti-missile missiles or rely on laser technology.

The risk remains that one power might establish a lead over the other for a longer period.

The underdog might feel dangerously insecure, while the other could succumb to the temptation to make use of its advantage while the going was good.

This state of affairs demonstrates, moreover, that for reasons of mutual mistrust the world powers are simply not prepared to abide by agreements reached on renouncing one thing or another.

As long as there are no overall, global agreements of this kind the quest to strike a balance in existing, as it were, "conventional" sectors must be maintained.

The Soviet bid to make the Pershing 2 out to be a first-strike weapon and a threat to the balance of power is a burlesque lie and a deliberate attempt to disinform.

The US missiles lack the range to be any such thing. It is only capable of reaching targets on the western perimeter of the Soviet Union.

Disinformation and intimidation are also the aims of the assertion that there is an urgent threat of war being waged on the backs of a handful of carefully chosen and strictly limited Europeans.

The greatest deterrent is still the total incalculability of each and every armed conflict in Europe, especially as Europe is of vital importance to both superpowers.

If anything, it is even more vital for the Soviet Union that it is for the United States, which is self-sufficient.

Hans-Joachim Nitz  
(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 9 April 1983)

## Soviet threat a bid to foil missiles plan

has stationed, threatening Western Europe both militarily and politically.

In spelling out the Soviet retaliation potential he did a number of fellow-travellers in Western Europe a disservice.

Soviet retaliation for the deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles, he said, would be no means be limited solely to Western Europe.

It would inevitably extend to the United States too.

The claim that Washington plans to use missile modernisation as a means of

decoupling Western Europe from joint defence and waging a nuclear war limited to Europe happens to be part of the stock-in-trade of anti-American propagandists.

The offers of disarmament and renunciation of the use of force made in Prague are by no means uninteresting, but they call for careful analysis.

As long as the Soviet Union uses inaccurate figures to the Vienna troop cut talks and shirks at Madrid its humanitarian and political obligations arising from the Helsinki accords the West should remain sceptical.

Moscow could demonstrate its willingness to disarm much more convincingly by dismantling a missile belt that threatens all Western Europe.

That is a move that would end Nato's missile modernisation plans once and for all.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 9 April 1983)



## WORLD AFFAIRS

## Despite Gromyko, door to missiles compromise has not seen slammed

A new coalition has emerged in Bonn: the coalition of the disappointed.

The man behind the mood is Andrei Gromyko, the longest-serving Soviet Foreign Minister and thus the most experienced advocate of the Soviet Union's foreign and security policy interests.

His reaction to President Reagan's suggestion for an interim agreement for the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles has triggered off criticism in (almost) all of Bonn's political parties.

Only the Greens remain silent, a logically consistent tactically considering that they regard the NATO double-decision as incorrect anyway.

No matter who suggests an interim agreement, they cannot expect support from this newcomer to the Bundestag.

The Greens, who are apparently backed on this point by Oskar Lafontaine, member of the SPD's national executive, are also holding back on commentaries on the negative reactions to the proposals.

However, political realities are not as uncomplicated as that. It looks as if the two superpowers have decided to conduct a large part of their negotiating via public speeches and press conferences, detouring as it were the conference table via public opinion.

Doubts are in order as to whether this approach is conducive to success in Geneva, with prestige and loss of face at risk if compromises backfire.

A solution will certainly not be reached if both sides remain inflexible.

Ever since 30 November, 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating in Geneva on land-based, nuclear "greater-distance medium-range missiles", i.e. those which can travel between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometres (INF talks).

The start to negotiations was made possible after the Soviet Union, despite statements to the contrary made to Chancellor Schmidt in June 1980, declared itself willing to go to the conference table.

It then took another year of deep-rooted reservations by President Reagan towards the Soviet Union in general and towards arms control in particular before talks actually got under way.

Ever since, both negotiating partners have been unable to resolve the central problem: defining the term "balance of power" in such a way as to make it understandable to both sides and thus turn it into an acceptable premise for agreement.

The Soviet Union is basically unchanged in its opinion that this balance already exists and that the scheduled deployment by NATO of medium-range missiles in Western Europe would upset this equilibrium at the expense of the Soviet Union.

During a press conference in which Andrei Gromyko replied to President Reagan's suggestion of a compromise solution in Geneva, this assessment of the situation was again reinforced.

However, there are a few things the Soviet Union must explain in this respect: In May 1978, the Soviet Union also felt that there was a balance of power. Then it had over 108 SS-20 launchers.

Today, there are 350 of these systems



ready for operation. It can be presumed that each of the launching platforms has at least one triple-warhead missile. This potential is pretty impressive.

NATO, on the other hand, only has plans for the deployment of 572 single-warhead missiles beginning in autumn this year in accordance with the NATO double-decision.

France is only country which today already has 18 of the land-based nuclear medium-range missiles of the kind being discussed in Geneva. The figures therefore speak for themselves.

They certainly do not present a firm footing for Gromyko's diagnosis of a balance of power.

His main argument, therefore, is of a more fundamental political nature.

The Soviet Union lays a twofold claim: first, to being a world power of equal status to the USA; and second, to ensuring its position of superiority in Europe.

Both claims are to be reflected in terms of military capacity.

In this respect, however, the nuclear potentials of France and Britain have a pretty important say in the matter.

The modernisation programme

under way will mean that these two countries alone will possess over 1,000 medium-range nuclear warheads by the mid-1990s.

This shows that negotiations which are limited to the Soviet-American balance of power alone will ultimately prove inadequate.

The zero option put forward by President Reagan in November 1981, supported by his Allies, was hushed especially on this bilateral approach.

Reagan and his supporters have taken almost two years to show signs of compromise at the conference table.

Hopefully, the new move will pave the way for the future.

On 29 March, one day before the Easter break, US-negotiator Paul Nitze brought a new three-point plan to the Geneva talks.

The primary aim is to achieve an interim agreement on low a level of armament as possible.

To this end, Washington agrees to cut down the number of its warheads providing the Soviet Union agrees on a ceiling level valid for both parties.

The zero option will still remain on the conference table, not so much as a package deal but as a permanent reminder of the ultimate objective behind the interim agreement.

The latter is to be regarded as a first step towards the removal of all medium-range nuclear missiles.

## Soviet poser: are 27 Pershings better than 54?

these "hawks" by his own ideological stance.

Political pressure at home, however, the bulging opposition of the freeze movement, and his own ambitions to serve another term as President prompted the President into showing signs of greater flexibility.

The new American move is certainly late in coming. And what is more, it's still pretty vague: no concrete facts and figures yet.

It looks as if Reagan is leaving it up to the Soviets to make the next move and come up with a counterproposal.

If they don't it will be easier to pass the buck when looking for a scapegoat for the failure of talks in Geneva.

This may not be the most favourable line of negotiation and Reagan may find it hard to stay this course.

US-negotiator, Paul Nitze, is going to have to lay his cards on the table pretty soon and deliver some kind of draft compromise solution from the West.

At first glance, and even at second, the Soviet reaction is not all that encouraging.

Gromyko reiterated what Moscow has been saying for months: If new US weapons are deployed in Western Europe, the Soviets will have to resort to "countermeasures".

The Soviet Foreign Minister referred to the Reagan proposal as quite simply "unacceptable".

And even if he didn't make any threats, or conjure up horror visions of

According to the third point, negotiators should make efforts to publish the precise number of warheads covered by such an agreement.

Admittedly, there is nothing new about this suggestion, but it is now being stuck to well-worn criteria.

There is no taking into account third-party systems, i.e. no British and no Chinese involvement.

Furthermore, the agreement has no global application, which means there will be no shifting of the Europe to Asia via relocating the deployment.

Finally, reliable verification facilities are demanded to ensure that the parties abide by the agreement.

Gromyko has already rejected the idea of global application, i.e. the Soviet Union's security interests in Asia, in particular vis-à-vis the power China.

Harsh words were uttered in regard to the failure to include the British missiles in the final solution.

However, the Soviet Foreign Minister Josef Strauss should not have been slammed shut for his empty compromise.

Even in the eventuality of employment this year, Gromyko threatened to break off negotiations.

The path is still free to a solution.

Both sides must now start to other's security interests more and thus remain willing and seek a compromise.

The invitation to Chancellor Kohl to visit the Soviet Union announced last week can also be seen as a signal of readiness to negotiate.

But, however, it must be said that no government party has ever made as few promises as the CDU/CSU in the last election.

In the contrary. All the conservatives are now tightening of belts. Deeds, or perhaps because of it, the conservatives won.

Helmut Kohl, who likes to think of himself as Adenauer's "grandson and heir," actually thinks in the same simple categories as his great idol: What can we do for our next aim now? "What can sensibly be done?" (Jaspers).

In his election campaign, Kohl called for "honesty." Max Weber said: "Every individual and the nation as a whole is duty-bound to exercise self-discipline and truthfulness."

This also delineates the framework on which this coalition agreement rests. "In political thought and in philosophy, utopias are the means with which to get a clearer grasp of the significance of realities and make the way to an optimum palpable." (Jaspers)

Like Adenauer in the 1950s, Kohl's election victory in March gave him "the power to risk the extraordinary, though also risking his position of power." (Jaspers)

This is an exact description of Chancellor Kohl's political position. It is also a yardstick by which to measure him; but the coalition paper does not exactly set high standards.

With all this in mind, it is well worth while addressing another Karl Jaspers quote to the chancellor: "Does he say and do what the people in this situation unconsciously demand? Does he face the people as a paragon of frankness and truthfulness? Does he awaken sound impulses in the citizens? Does he lend impetus to the earnestness of the public spirit?"

Using this as a yardstick, the coalition agreement falls short. It is a programme of sober rationalism, written in a style of pragmatic self-moderation and almost embarrassingly "normal" in places. It is more serviceable than inspiring, and there is no sign of vision.

Helmut Kohl, the political fundamentalist, has acted on the principle that politics in general, coalition talks in particular, should be the art of the possible. In this way, he achieved more than he had expected.

Forgoing a cabinet post in Bonn, he achieved more conservative policy than less liberalism. To sum up: Kohl

## HOME AFFAIRS

## Rapid coalition agreement results in document full of ambiguities

ever in the history of the Federal Republic have coalition negotiations been as quick and smooth as the one between the CDU/CSU and the SPD.

seldom has a coalition agreement been so little. It seems with general agreement and reads like a horoscope. You read into it what you will.

It is only clear in some of the statements of principle: for example that the coalition should not regiment the people.

From beginning to end the document is ambiguous. It is written in poor German. Turns of phrase are used which are meant to keep as much as possible in abeyance.

More binding details would have been easier to control.

Kohl's tendency towards generalities is open to interpretation has provided the Free Democrats, who are used for consensus, with a broad area of common ground.

Though there are political reasons for an approach, the agreement shows indication — or at least does not indicate — that the envisaged measures will have to be realised millimetre by millimetre in the next four years.

But, however, it must be said that no government party has ever made as few promises as the CDU/CSU in the last election.

In the contrary. All the conservatives are now tightening of belts. Deeds, or perhaps because of it, the conservatives won.

Helmut Kohl, who likes to think of himself as Adenauer's "grandson and heir," actually thinks in the same simple categories as his great idol: What can we do for our next aim now? "What can sensibly be done?" (Jaspers).

In his election campaign, Kohl called for "honesty." Max Weber said: "Every individual and the nation as a whole is duty-bound to exercise self-discipline and truthfulness."

This also delineates the framework on which this coalition agreement rests. "In political thought and in philosophy, utopias are the means with which to get a clearer grasp of the significance of realities and make the way to an optimum palpable." (Jaspers)

Like Adenauer in the 1950s, Kohl's election victory in March gave him "the power to risk the extraordinary, though also risking his position of power." (Jaspers)

This is an exact description of Chancellor Kohl's political position. It is also a yardstick by which to measure him; but the coalition paper does not exactly set high standards.

With all this in mind, it is well worth while addressing another Karl Jaspers quote to the chancellor: "Does he say and do what the people in this situation unconsciously demand? Does he face the people as a paragon of frankness and truthfulness? Does he awaken sound impulses in the citizens? Does he lend impetus to the earnestness of the public spirit?"

Using this as a yardstick, the coalition agreement falls short. It is a programme of sober rationalism, written in a style of pragmatic self-moderation and almost embarrassingly "normal" in places. It is more serviceable than inspiring, and there is no sign of vision.

Helmut Kohl, the political fundamentalist, has acted on the principle that politics in general, coalition talks in particular, should be the art of the possible. In this way, he achieved more than he had expected.

Forgoing a cabinet post in Bonn, he achieved more conservative policy than less liberalism. To sum up: Kohl

prevailed but Strauss ensured that influence remains.

Here again we have a compromise between the CDU, whose profile has always been somewhat blurred, and the strongly etched Bavarian CSU.

Still, the CDU succeeded in articulating its sympathy for the FDP while the CSU prevailed in insisting that "The Change" be implemented. The FDP successfully stood its ground in between.

Nobody who has analysed this paper can seriously claim that the parties to it have presented the German people with "an historic concept."

The word "reform" that was so badly overused by the first SPD-FDP government (1969-1972) is conspicuous through its absence in the present paper.

The coalition partners deliberately did not artificially streamline their programme. All their plans, arguments and agreements are based on a concept of politics to the effect that hectic frenzy is no programme.

The coalition leaders have thus adopted a stance as formulated by Karl Jaspers in his remarks on Max Weber's political philosophy: Think of the future while doing what is necessary at the moment.

Helmut Kohl, who likes to think of himself as Adenauer's "grandson and heir," actually thinks in the same simple categories as his great idol: What can we do for our next aim now? "What can sensibly be done?" (Jaspers).


In his election campaign, Kohl called for "honesty." Max Weber said: "Every individual and the nation as a whole is duty-bound to exercise self-discipline and truthfulness."

This also delineates the framework on which this coalition agreement rests. "In political thought and in philosophy, utopias are the means with which to get a clearer grasp of the significance of realities and make the way to an optimum palpable." (Jaspers)

Like Adenauer in the 1950s, Kohl's election victory in March gave him "the power to risk the extraordinary, though also risking his position of power." (Jaspers)

This is an exact description of Chancellor Kohl's political position. It is also a yardstick by which to measure him; but the coalition paper does not exactly set high standards.

With all this in mind, it is well worth while addressing another Karl Jaspers quote to the chancellor: "Does he say and do what the people in this situation unconsciously demand? Does he face the people as a paragon of frankness and truthfulness? Does he awaken sound impulses in the citizens? Does he lend impetus to the earnestness of the public spirit?"



prevailed but Strauss ensured that influence remains.

Here again we have a compromise between the CDU, whose profile has always been somewhat blurred, and the strongly etched Bavarian CSU.

Still, the CDU succeeded in articulating its sympathy for the FDP while the CSU prevailed in insisting that "The Change" be implemented. The FDP successfully stood its ground in between.

Nobody who has analysed this paper can seriously claim that the parties to it have presented the German people with "an historic concept."

The word "reform" that was so badly overused by the first SPD-FDP government (1969-1972) is conspicuous through its absence in the present paper.

The coalition partners deliberately did not artificially streamline their programme. All their plans, arguments and agreements are based on a concept of politics to the effect that hectic frenzy is no programme.

The coalition leaders have thus adopted a stance as formulated by Karl Jaspers in his remarks on Max Weber's political philosophy: Think of the future while doing what is necessary at the moment.

Helmut Kohl, who likes to think of himself as Adenauer's "grandson and heir," actually thinks in the same simple categories as his great idol: What can we do for our next aim now? "What can sensibly be done?" (Jaspers).

In his election campaign, Kohl called for "honesty." Max Weber said: "Every individual and the nation as a whole is duty-bound to exercise self-discipline and truthfulness."

This also delineates the framework on which this coalition agreement rests. "In political thought and in philosophy, utopias are the means with which to get a clearer grasp of the significance of realities and make the way to an optimum palpable." (Jaspers)

Like Adenauer in the 1950s, Kohl's election victory in March gave him "the power to risk the extraordinary, though also risking his position of power." (Jaspers)

This is an exact description of Chancellor Kohl's political position. It is also a yardstick by which to measure him; but the coalition paper does not exactly set high standards.

With all this in mind, it is well worth while addressing another Karl Jaspers quote to the chancellor: "Does he say and do what the people in this situation unconsciously demand? Does he face the people as a paragon of frankness and truthfulness? Does he awaken sound impulses in the citizens? Does he lend impetus to the earnestness of the public spirit?"

Using this as a yardstick, the coalition agreement falls short. It is a programme of sober rationalism, written in a style of pragmatic self-moderation and almost embarrassingly "normal" in places. It is more serviceable than inspiring, and there is no sign of vision.

Helmut Kohl, the political fundamentalist, has acted on the principle that politics in general, coalition talks in particular, should be the art of the possible. In this way, he achieved more than he had expected.

Forgoing a cabinet post in Bonn, he achieved more conservative policy than less liberalism. To sum up: Kohl

prevailed but Strauss ensured that influence remains.

Here again we have a compromise between the CDU, whose profile has always been somewhat blurred, and the strongly etched Bavarian CSU.

Still, the CDU succeeded in articulating its sympathy for the FDP while the CSU prevailed in insisting that "The Change" be implemented. The FDP successfully stood its ground in between.

Nobody who has analysed this paper can seriously claim that the parties to it have presented the German people with "an historic concept."

The word "reform" that was so badly overused by the first SPD-FDP government (1969-1972) is conspicuous through its absence in the present paper.

The coalition partners deliberately did not artificially streamline their programme. All their plans, arguments and agreements are based on a concept of politics to the effect that hectic frenzy is no programme.

The coalition leaders have thus adopted a stance as formulated by Karl Jaspers in his remarks on Max Weber's political philosophy: Think of the future while doing what is necessary at the moment.

Helmut Kohl, who likes to think of himself as Adenauer's "grandson and heir," actually thinks in the same simple categories as his great idol: What can we do for our next aim now? "What can sensibly be done?" (Jaspers).

In his election campaign, Kohl called for "honesty." Max Weber said: "Every individual and the nation as a whole is duty-bound to exercise self-discipline and truthfulness."

This also delineates the framework on which this coalition agreement rests. "In political thought and in philosophy, utopias are the means with which to get a clearer grasp of the significance of realities and make the way to an optimum palpable." (Jaspers)

Like Adenauer in the 1950s, Kohl's election victory in March gave him "the power to risk the extraordinary, though also risking his position of power." (Jaspers)

This is an exact description of Chancellor Kohl's political position. It is also a yardstick by which to measure him; but the coalition paper does not exactly set high standards.

With all this in mind, it is well worth while addressing another Karl Jaspers quote to the chancellor: "Does he say and do what the people in this situation unconsciously demand? Does he face the people as a paragon of frankness and truthfulness? Does he awaken sound impulses in the citizens? Does he lend impetus to the earnestness of the public spirit?"

Using this as a yardstick, the coalition agreement falls short. It is a programme of sober rationalism, written in a style of pragmatic self-moderation and almost embarrassingly "normal" in places. It is more serviceable than inspiring, and there is no sign of vision.

was" cemented by cautious declarations of intent. There are formulations such as "It is agreed that a structural reform of the social security pensions scheme is necessary."

Consensus also exists on "the necessity to encourage foreigners to return to their home countries by permitting them to capitalise their social security claims."

The same applies in the economic policy sector: "The federal government asserts its market economy position in foreign affairs and its domestic market policy in Europe."

The maximum of consensus was achieved in the fiscal policy field where the parties to the agreement also seem most determined to follow through: "The fiscal policy must above all bolster the beginning economic upturn and promote growth impulses that will improve the employment situation."

The sections dealing with the budget and fiscal policy are the most concrete.

But a closer look at the paper shows few political highlights in this respect. In parts of the paper the coalition parties seem to be trying to encourage themselves, using such formulations as "should," "will" or indeed "must" to prevent themselves from seeking a way out.

For example: "Wherever possible, investment spending should remain unaffected by the cutbacks."

## 6 Lacklustre political hodgepodge of declarations of intent and catchphrases

Or: "There must be no shift of burdens from the federal government to the states."

Or: "We will prepare a new income tax rate that will provide relief for the citizen."

The paper then becomes quite concrete on the issue of consolidating the budget: "It is necessary to consolidate federal, state and municipal budgets. Public sector budgets will be improved to the tune of DM38bn to DM40bn between 1984 and 1986, meaning an annual rate of DM6.5bn to DM7bn for the federal budget, DM4.8bn for the states and about DM1.5bn for the municipalities."

The paper is rather accommodating on the issue of the surtax for higher earners: "The surtax is to be levied at the present rate not only for 1983 and 1984 but also for 1985. It is not to be repaid after four but after seven years, i.e. in 1990, 1991 and 1992."

And, finally, the disenchanted citizen is told that he will get no interest on the surtax even under the new arrangement for a later repayment.

Incidentally, the loss in interest corresponds to the amount of the levy.

This is a shaky compromise and there are indications that harsh disputes between the coalition partners have already been programmed.

Deutschlandpolitik and foreign affairs were probably the easiest issues to agree on — at least in outline. But nothing has been laid down in writing.

Security policy has in any event never been a bone of contention between the conservatives and the FDP. They are agreed on upholding the two-track NATO decision and determined to deploy the new generation of intermediate range US missiles should no agreement be reached in Geneva.

The paper says surprisingly little about new initiatives in Bonn's Europe

Continued on page 7



# Barzel, the man who almost became Chancellor

**Rudolf Grösskopf**  
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt,  
10 April 1983)



## Battle for the stomachs of the world: grains of truth on both sides

The head-on collision over farm exports between the USA and the EEC was predictable; yet the policy makers on both sides feel that their actions have been right.

"I'm always surprised to see how the Community gets unjustly criticised for its agricultural policy — especially by the USA," says Paul Dalsager, member of the EEC Commission and concerned with agricultural affairs.

But US policy is guided more by self-interest than by the code of conduct tediously worked out over the years by the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Quipped US Agricultural Secretary Brock in Congress in January: "We must teach somebody a lesson."

At that time, Brock knew that his officials were about to land a huge wheat flour deal with Egypt that would cut Western sales to that country by 90 per cent.

The "lesson" Brock taught the EEC in Egypt is only the most spectacular of a series of US reprisals for what the Washington Administration calls the Community's "impermissible" subsidies of farm exports paid out of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds.

The fact is that EEC agricultural exporters would be hard pressed to find buyers if they were to offer the goods at prices paid to Community producers, which are 40 per cent above world market prices.

But then, world market prices are determined by the USA: The most important single criterion for the subsidies the CAP pays to exporters is the price on America's domestic market.

### Pricing dilemma

These prices, balanced against those of the next most important agricultural exporters (Australia and Canada), account for the difference between world market prices and the higher domestic prices guaranteed by the EEC to its farmers.

EEC exporters can calculate on the basis of internal Community prices because the difference between those and world market prices is made up for by the CAP.

But due to the EEC Commission's extremely cautious periodical price fixing, Community exporters are in no position to undercut US prices without running up losses.

By the same token, US exporters can do exactly this — not directly but via exceptionally soft export credits or by exporting within the framework of non-repayable development aid.

Thus, for instance, US guaranteed American wheat credits — as in the case of Portugal and Zaire recently — have been granted over periods of up to 40 years.

French wheat salesmen therefore stood no chance in Morocco when their US competitors threw in a road and a harbour installation as a bonus to go with their shipments.

Said Brock to a Congressional committee: "What we're talking about here is credits and not subsidies."

But in its "blitzkrieg action" (Bonn



Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff) in Cairo the US for the first time also resorted to direct and open subsidies that made the overall price for the one million tons of wheat flour about 25 per cent cheaper than the cheapest flour to be had on the market today.

A spokesman for the EEC Commission: "At that price you cannot even buy unharvested grain, let alone flour."

President Reagan's farm exporters have become aggressive lately, as borne out by Department of Commerce Under Secretary Brock who said: "If the Europeans are unable to export without subsidies, let them keep their stuff at home instead of spoiling world markets."

But the EEC Commission figures that America's federal farm subsidies (i.e. without state subsidies) for surpluses amount to 37.6 per cent and are thus in line with the 39.2 per cent subsidies by the EEC and its individual member states.

The Community nations are particularly angered about American accusations that their agricultural policy is unfair and illegal towards America's honest and free-trading farmers.

A paper by the EEC Commission rebuts the American allegations, saying: "On the subject of import restrictions: US criticism of the CAP is ironic because the USA — unlike the EEC — has enjoyed special, temporary, exemptions from GATT rules since 1955 and has not had to abide by GATT regulations governing agricultural goods. Under these exemptions, the USA has been at liberty to apply import restrictions to products which it subsidises, such as cotton, sugar, peanuts and dairy products."

And indeed, the US authorities do not hesitate to close their border to imports from Europe and other countries whenever their own producers chafe under foreign competition. In the past few years, this has applied to cheese, wine and spaghetti.

But by the same token, the Americans raise no end of a ruckus when the Community tries to stop its market from being flooded with American farm products. Thus, for instance, US animal feed (soya bean and maize based) and manioc starch have managed to displace close to half of the Community's feed grain from its own market over the past few years.

Last year, when farm associations — spearheaded by France — called for barriers against further US market shares in Europe in this field, both houses of Congress threatened countermeasures following a motion by representatives from Illinois, the state that houses the two export companies that account for one-quarter of the maize-based animal feed exported to Europe.

The EEC paper: "We are told by the Washington Administration that the USA considers its access to the Community market non-negotiable."

But it was not until the flour coup — the US had meanwhile also started negotiating a subsidised butter deal with Cairo that will make it impossible for

the Community to sell its surplus butter to Egypt — that the otherwise restrained Commission became really angry, saying:

"It is out of the question to re-negotiate the GATT rules governing international trade in agricultural products and the system of export subsidies — especially so shortly after the closing of the Tokyo Round which achieved a long-eluded agreement after years of protracted and tedious negotiations."

"What is more, it seems arbitrary and illogical to criticise the EEC for its export subsidies without examining the export subsidies of the other parties to the GATT agreement, including such US procedures as surplus sales coupled with 'mixed credits' and other interest subsidies."

In the past 18 months, America has initiated eight GATT investigations of EEC agricultural practices, making it clear, according to the Commission paper, that "the USA expects the Community to change its CAP should the investigations show the procedure to be faulty."

US representatives have said that they want to bring about a change in the GATT rules should the investigations arrive at conclusions unfavourable to America. It's like flipping a coin.

Are Wild West rules to predominate on agricultural markets in the future? Both parties, the USA and the EEC, the world's major producers of farm products, are equally responsible for the present clash.

They have brought it about through protectionist subsidies that virtually guaranteed growing surpluses and through their economic and monetary policies that have made it increasingly difficult for buyers to pay for the goods. Secure and guaranteed domestic markets led to growing surpluses and the need to export.

In the past ten years, EEC farm exports have risen by 513 per cent and those of the USA by 536 per cent.

The trouble is that the most important buyer countries, the populous Third World nations and the East Bloc, are in financial trouble. They have suffered most in the areas most likely to enable them to earn foreign exchange with which to pay for agricultural imports due to America's monetary policy and the world-wide recession.

A trade war between such agricultural surplus countries as the USA, the EEC, Canada and Australia would not necessarily result in advantages for the Third World as a whole.

Some of the developing countries, especially in Africa, could derive short-term profits from "the worst and bloodiest of subsidy wars" which the surplus countries are preparing to wage, according to Brussels experts; but temporarily cheaper farm imports would not solve the Third World's food problem.

The reason is that too low prices paid to their own farmers and too low incomes of the urban population would contribute much more to Third World famine than absolute food shortages.

The representative of one West African nation: "A price war between the major surplus countries would wreck our tediously developed self-sufficiency programme."

Some threshold countries developed to the point where produce enough food for and even export to other nations — such as India and — are also irked by the price of the major producers applies to countries like Argentina on agricultural exports.

A Latin American diplomat says: "No Third World keeps pace with American agricultural investments; we keep pace with their aggression. We're falling further behind, to the point where we not only have pushed out of our markets but also out of our nets."

In the current dispute — the response has been so bad that in the time being to America — the Community has virtually been begged to take part, against American accusations, in a registration time was extended by ing to its correct trade policy, arguing that it is only trying to do what does look as if the 8,200 square traditional share of farm exports available will, after all, be taken

Figures substantiate this: EEC countries have accounted for about ten per cent of farm exports in Bonn. It is the first government the past two decades (15 per cent of the show to be held in a foreign case of wheat). While the form exports has remained unchanged, the trade volume has multiplied during the same period with the attendant risks.

Dalsager sees the risks clearly: public relations work in Germany higher the export volume than in the more current cycle when the many groups involved in on world markets make itself felt in the show together.

One reason for the poor response la been neglected. Another is that the German aerospace leader MBB, Nor do the Japanese know that Germany has a very successful computer company: Nixdorf.

Nobody has heard of Mannesmann. And all the average Japanese know about Siemens is that company was involved in a graft scandal with the Japanese navy before World War I. Despite its cooperation with the Japanese computer and robot maker Fujitsu, Siemens has fallen behind in that field. Siemens electronics products, though sold under its own name, are largely made with Japanese components. And Japanese who have to see a dentist or stay in a hospital might know that Siemens makes medical equipment.

At least Siemens is one of the participants in Tokyo. MBB should also attend with some of its space and aviation technology (at least with the helicopters it jointly makes with Japan's Kawasaki). There is no need for MBB to exhibit any of its weapons systems.

It would be particularly sensational if MBB and Krauss-Maffei could agree to show their magnet-operated Transrapid train which was first presented in Munich.

Japan's state railway system has for years been working on the development of this type of technology.

Gebhard Hielscher (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 March 1983)

### Backfiring

But the Reagan Administration's inconsistencies in this respect are singularly backfiring now.

Ronald Reagan's campaign to the wheat and maize based American South and Midwest production, resulting in surplus falling prices.

This, in turn, has resulted in the foreign affairs sector. Europeans were clearly upset when President Reagan decided to sell the Soviets while at the same time attempting to thwart the European gas deal. To top it, he imposed trade surplus in 1982 and the agricultural embargo on Poland and Afghanistan.

By starting his frontal attack on the farm export markets of the Williamsburg, Va., summit of the most important industrial nations in May, he has turned partners into slaves.

Heino (Deutscher Alltagsdienst)

### TRADE

## Industry lukewarm towards exhibiting in Japan

Plans to hold a German Industrial show in Tokyo are being set back by German business has shown interest. There are 95 exhibitors so far. But many major industrial names are missing.

Many of those who have agreed to take part are doing so on a modest scale.

The response has been so bad that in the time being to America — the Community has virtually been begged to take part, against American accusations, in a registration time was extended by ing to its correct trade policy, arguing that it is only trying to do what does look as if the 8,200 square traditional share of farm exports available will, after all, be taken

Figures substantiate this: EEC countries have accounted for about ten per cent of farm exports in Bonn. It is the first government the past two decades (15 per cent of the show to be held in a foreign case of wheat). While the form exports has remained unchanged, the trade volume has multiplied during the same period with the attendant risks.

Dalsager sees the risks clearly: public relations work in Germany higher the export volume than in the more current cycle when the many groups involved in on world markets make itself felt in the show together.

One reason for the poor response la been neglected. Another is that the German aerospace leader MBB, Nor do the Japanese know that Germany has a very successful computer company: Nixdorf.

Nobody has heard of Mannesmann. And all the average Japanese know about Siemens is that company was involved in a graft scandal with the Japanese navy before World War I. Despite its cooperation with the Japanese computer and robot maker Fujitsu, Siemens has fallen behind in that field. Siemens electronics products, though sold under its own name, are largely made with Japanese components. And Japanese who have to see a dentist or stay in a hospital might know that Siemens makes medical equipment.

At least Siemens is one of the participants in Tokyo. MBB should also attend with some of its space and aviation technology (at least with the helicopters it jointly makes with Japan's Kawasaki). There is no need for MBB to exhibit any of its weapons systems.

It would be particularly sensational if MBB and Krauss-Maffei could agree to show their magnet-operated Transrapid train which was first presented in Munich.

Japan's state railway system has for years been working on the development of this type of technology.

Gebhard Hielscher (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 March 1983)

Continued from page 3


policy, although the chancellor and the foreign minister are planning some rhetoric on this issue.

There is virtually no active Ostpolitik, whose aim is summed up rather generally as "peaceful coexistence and good relations."

Strauss' ideas are clearly in evidence: Deutschlandpolitik is to become a tit-for-tat affair, a policy of nuance with course corrections where needed.

The paper provides a framework tenuously held together by a few basic data.

The biting criticism by the CDU social affairs committees is only too understandable: there are too many catchphrases, with the substance still to be delivered.



## Competition puts exports under increasing competition

German companies have remained competitive on world markets despite tougher competition. Long-range prospects are also favourable, according to a DIHT survey of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (AHK).

But the German export industry has become more vulnerable than the survey seems to indicate.

Quite apart from incalculable political risks and protectionist trends, there are weak points that have been disguised by, among other things, the low Deutschmark exchange rate.

The DIHT survey encompassed 42 countries accounting for more than four-fifths of Germany's foreign trade and 90 per cent of its foreign investments.

The main reasons for the competitiveness is the high quality of its products, the Deutschmark exchange rate, and a favourable assortment of goods tailor-made — especially in the capital goods sector — to match the demand on world markets.

Prices of German goods have risen less steeply than those of competing countries.

But Germany's position does not present a uniform picture on all of the world markets.

The improvement is accounted for primarily by the American and a number of other markets in dollar-oriented countries such as Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. The same applies to New Zealand, India and Saudi Arabia.

Granted, a coalition agreement cannot lyricise nor can it be a declaration of love.

The document expresses agreement on a limited business deal with joint liability. It is boring rather than progressive and of an only just tolerable mediocrity that would perhaps have been applicable to normal times.

All that can be said for it is that it does not resort to any kind of political euphoria.

What is articulated is the politically necessary and obvious.

It is a programme that can be termed politically consistent though it has scarcely clear of attributing specific values. It is anything but a political timetable for the year 2000.

Alois Rummel (Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 8 April 1983)

Germany's position on European markets has remained largely unchanged, though there are considerable differences from country to country.

While the position of German exporters in France and Britain has improved, it has deteriorated in the Benelux countries.

In Japan and Korea, Germany's position has been declining steeply in the past few years.

German business is coming under increasing pressure from foreign competitors. This applies to both competition from producers in the importing country itself and to foreign competition.

Local competition in Holland, for example, has become stiffer. In addition, German exporters are being thwarted by nationalisation drives and protectionist practices.

Venezuela has introduced protectionist tariffs while France and Britain have embarked on "Buy French" and "Buy British" campaigns.

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 25 March 1983)

## Level of foreign investment is maintained

German business invested close to DM10bn abroad last year despite the recession at home, according to the Bonn Economic Affairs Ministry.

The lion's share (DM3.275bn) went to the USA, which remains the most important country for German investments abroad.

Last year's DM9.76bn direct investments abroad almost matched the previous year's record figure.

More than DM7.5bn went to industrial countries and DM2.2bn to developing nations.

The USA is followed by Britain (DM1bn), Belgium/Luxembourg (DM750m), Brazil (DM600m) and Holland (DM550m).

Like before, much of the investments abroad was in the road vehicles industry (DM1bn) followed by electrical engineering and banking (DM900m).

Foreign direct investments in the Federal Republic of Germany hit a new record since 1975. The biggest share was accounted for by the USA (DM1.2bn) followed by Britain.

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 30 March 1983)







## QUESTS

## Looking for water under the barren wastes of the Sahara desert

Barren wastes, an endless sea of sand and rocks which confuse the senses. Temperatures of 50 degrees centigrade. The camels find it difficult to keep moving. We've covered about 800 kilometres since leaving Murzuk oasis.

These were some of the impressions of German Africa researcher Gustav Naethigal who in 1899 was the first European to reach the Tibesti mountains, the "roof of the Sahara."

This mountain range is a chain of extinct volcanoes, and towers 3,400 metres above its desert environment, a steep island of rock in the desert's sandy ocean.

Decades later, interest yet again centres on the former ravines of the Tibesti.

In 1982 Uwe Georg, a Sahara researcher from Hamburg, described this area in his expedition report:

"Beneath the eroded rocks we gazed down upon a sight which cannot be compared to anything else on this earth. In the middle of this vast desert, where in many part it only rains a few times each century, we found ourselves staring at a deep blue sea churned up by the wind. The surf roared between the palms and the spray was carried into the desert."

The lake of Ouninanga Serir described here runs contrary to the usual picture of the waterless Sahara.

The desert waters, almost as large as Lake Ploen, are said to be one of the miracles of nature in this region.

Although at least six metres is taken off the water-level each year by natural evaporation (corresponding to about 180 million cubic metres volume) and despite the fact that there has been no rain here for eleven years, the water-level always returns to the same height.

Without support from the ground water, the lake in the north of Chad would evaporate and dry up completely within four years.

Lake Ouninanga Serir clearly proves that there are large reserves of water beneath the Sahara desert, particularly in the reservoir rock of the Tibesti mountains.

Geographer and also Sahara researcher Helmut Schifflers, from Cologne, feels that the term "sea of sand" could prove to be a misnomer.

"There are at least 26 lakes in the Sahara and large reserves of ground water. Scientists are now convinced that there are so many billions of cubic metres of water in this 'Bahr bela ma' (Arabic for 'sea without water') that we shall soon be talking about the 'sea beneath the Sahara'."

The exploration to discover these water reserves is well under way.

Countries such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco are busy propagating a "departure to the desert," the setting-up of new oases, settlement and industrial centres, huge farms and irrigation plants.

The problems in Egypt are particularly urgent, 97 per cent of this country consisting of desert.

The fertile area near the Nile valley and delta is suffering from over-population and is gradually being ecologically "drained."

The words spoken by the French geologist Raymond Furon still hold true: "Even in the era of uranium and oil,

water remains the most valuable raw material in the Sahara."

Not only is it essential for the survival of humans and the irrigation of grain fields and vegetable plantations, the extraction of other raw materials such as ores, crude oil, natural gas and phosphates is impossible without large reserves of water.

With its almost nine million square kilometres, the Sahara accounts for just under a third of Africa's total surface area.

Eighty per cent of this desert has less than 50 millimetres of rain a year and 1.5 million square kilometres have virtually none at all.

In Europe, for example, annual rainfall is between 600 and 900 millimetres.

The Sahara is the world's largest dry area and it determines the face of a dozen states with a total population of one hundred million.

One of the most disturbing developments in recent years is the speed with which this desert is spreading in a southerly direction.

To take stock of the ground-water reserves in the eastern part of the Sahara is the objective behind a project by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Society for the Promotion of Research), in which about 100 scientists from 20 West German institutes are taking part.

Headed by geologist Professor Eberhard Klitzsch from the Technical University in Berlin, the project concentrates on a desert area measuring 1,000 times 1,500 kilometres.

Its interest centres on the structure and the development of the Sahara. This includes research on climatic and ecological changes, geological structures and ground-water and raw material reserves.

Many fields of science are involved in the society's programme entitled "Geo-Scientific Problems of Arid Areas." It includes geologists, ecologists and mineralogists.

The research area finds itself bordering three countries: Egypt, Sudan and Libya.

German researchers expect to find extensive ground-water reserves, which could be used for the Egyptian oasis and settlement project in the "New Valley" region.

Continued from page 8

up to the computer (very often the case already with military aircraft).

As Filz points out, "The fully electronic passenger aircraft with its revolutionary cockpit will remain the dream of many ambitious engineers in the field of aviation."

"However, to maintain that a plane will only need half the present level of fuel in ten years time is a more realistic assumption."

The increased use of electronics is the first step towards turning the flight captain into a flight manager.

At the same time, however, it means that one job is on the way out: the flight engineer.

The cockpit of the future will only require two people to handle operations: the pilot and the co-pilot.

Compared to the earth's long history, the Sahara only recently turned into a desert. Only 5,000 years ago many parts of the present-day desert were grassland or savannah regions, and woods, lakes, rivers, moorland and bushland were its geographical characteristics.

During this damp period the rainfall levels in the East Sahara figured at about 300 millimetres — as much as the present-day figure for the North African Mediterranean coast.

The average temperatures were about five to seven degrees lower than today's. This picture of a "wet" Sahara has been backed up by geological, palaeontological and archaeological findings.

The rock paintings in the Sahara mountains provided the first signs. Here, there are pictures of big game, herds of cattle and hunting scenes, a veritable art gallery of the green Sahara during the New Stone Age.

Up to now, over 30,000 rock paintings have been discovered. The cover up period of 9,000 years, the development from the nomadic hunters to the shepherds and farmers.

The water reserves expected in this area are the result of this damp period in history which lasted in varying degrees of intensity for about 40,000 years.

American scientists have been able to draw up a surprisingly accurate map of the underground water channels using satellite photos and radar.

Some of them were taken during last year's voyage by the Columbus space shuttle.

These instruments were able to make out river valleys, lakes and delta landscapes which are now buried beneath five metres of sand.

Some of the river valleys, 15 kilometres wide, once made their way through the desert. This was confirmed with the aid of radar echoes.

Rivers as large as the Nile once flowed from the central Sahara regions to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

The precipitation during these earlier periods has been stored in the seven large basins in the Sahara.

The "missing sea of the desert" is made up of ground water and deep

Cockpit, pilots and flight engineers union, is up in arms on this issue. It demands that the 'third man' be kept.

This organisation will have plenty of trouble over new developments in electronics, and it cannot share the fascination shown by the engineers at Airbus Industrie.

It has expressed its worried about faults and failures in the systems, even though each device has a threefold check and double check.

The 20 Lufthansa crews trained on the Airbus A300 are not so apprehensive.

As flight captain Walter Wollrab, the top A310 pilot, enthusiastically remarked: "Changing from the A300 to the A310 is like moving out of a family saloon car into a Porsche."

Heinz Michaels  
(Die Zeit, 1 April 1983)

water in the pores of the rocks and stones.

Ground-water zones reach a depth of 4,000 metres. If luck can hit the ground-water at a depth of 100 metres.

The largest underground water in the East Sahara are in Libya, the Chad Basin (where there is an inland sea with an area of square kilometres: today this is reduced to 15,000 sq km).

The research by the German scientists has confirmed that the ground-water beneath the Sahara is much thicker than at first assumed.

However, before such results are accepted, fundamental questions have to be answered.

One of the most important questions relates to the use of the water.

Or are the water zones replenished by flows of ground-water from surrounding the Sahara, for example the Atlas mountains, the Nile?

The Sahara states are hoping for new data will help them in the desert to set up huge settlement and projects and turn the desert into a land and grazing land.

According to estimates by the area of irrigated land in Libya and Tunisia could be doubled.

An extensive irrigation system has already been set up in the Libyan oases.

In the middle of the desert, the lucerne are grown and sheep are imported from New Zealand.

The aim is to cultivate 100,000 hectares of land.

During the initial euphoria, the Libyan government wanted to settle 6 million people in the basin.

Another most ambitious project is to irrigate 200,000 hectares in the Egyptian "New Valley" project area.

However, the scientists who are working in the Sahara and have discovered new reserves remain wary.

Many parts of the Sahara are suffering the after-effects of the exploitation of natural resources.

Oil drilling, mining and overgrazing have led to drops in the water level of up to 30 metres.

The vast amount of energy and technology needed to reach the reserves also moderates any fancy scientists may have.

In the scientific cost-benefit analysis the experts may find that the green Sahara is too much of a mirage.

Professor Klitzsch estimates water reserves beneath the eastern part of the Sahara at about 50,000 kilometres (although this sounds a deal, the Nile transports this amount of water to the sea in two years).

Berlin geologists expect 300,000 kilometres for the Sahara as a whole.

However, the high salt and content (over two per cent in cases) and the depths of drilling would make the "desert water" unusable to a limited extent.

What is more, the fact that a deal of these reserves may be water and as such cannot be used also sets a limit to the hopes.

Willy Lorenz  
(Rheinischer Merkur, 1 April 1983)

## LITERATURE

## Writers in exile: flight from the Nazi regime

years ago, many of the most prominent German writers were forced by circumstance to go into exile.

The attempts made by this literary group to escape the claws of the Nazi regime on independent period in the history of German literature.

This motto written by Kantorowicz formed the title to a manifesto published on 1st May, 1933, in Paris.

The emigré writer is expected to constantly remain aware of the fact the high mountains of the Alps are the wet parts of West Africa?

The Sahara states are hoping for new data will help them in the desert to set up huge settlement and projects and turn the desert into a land and grazing land.

According to estimates by the area of irrigated land in Libya and Tunisia could be doubled.

An extensive irrigation system has already been set up in the Libyan oases.

In the middle of the desert, the lucerne are grown and sheep are imported from New Zealand.

The aim is to cultivate 100,000 hectares of land.

During the initial euphoria, the Libyan government wanted to settle 6 million people in the basin.

Another most ambitious project is to irrigate 200,000 hectares in the Egyptian "New Valley" project area.

However, the scientists who are working in the Sahara and have discovered new reserves remain wary.

Many parts of the Sahara are suffering the after-effects of the exploitation of natural resources.

Oil drilling, mining and overgrazing have led to drops in the water level of up to 30 metres.

The vast amount of energy and technology needed to reach the reserves also moderates any fancy scientists may have.

In the scientific cost-benefit analysis the experts may find that the green Sahara is too much of a mirage.

Professor Klitzsch estimates water reserves beneath the eastern part of the Sahara at about 50,000 kilometres (although this sounds a deal, the Nile transports this amount of water to the sea in two years).

Berlin geologists expect 300,000 kilometres for the Sahara as a whole.

However, the high salt and content (over two per cent in cases) and the depths of drilling would make the "desert water" unusable to a limited extent.

What is more, the fact that a deal of these reserves may be water and as such cannot be used also sets a limit to the hopes.

Willy Lorenz  
(Rheinischer Merkur, 1 April 1983)

storm to pass," said Alfred Döblin, who gave in to the requests of friends and left for Switzerland on 28th February, 1933.

Brecht, Bacher, Ludwig Marcuse, Bruno Frank and Karl Wolfskehl also took their leave of Nazi Germany on the same day.

Convinced that the ghost haunting Germany would soon disappear, the majority of German writers decided to flee.

The Reichstag fire on 27th February triggered off this mass exodus.

This was the "d-day" which many had predicted without really believing it would ever come: the transition to a system of open fascist dictatorship.

During the weeks and months which followed, the list of exiles grew longer: Anna Seghers, Ernst Toller, Carl Zuckmayer, Arnold Zweig, Klaus Mann, Leonhard Frank, Hermann Kesten, Robert Neumann, Max Hermann-Neisse and many more.

Only a few of them were personally intimidated.

In all probability, "nothing much would have happened" to most of them if they had shown certain degree of conformity.

As Hans-Albert Walter, who has carried out special research on this subject, points out, fascism would have "even accepted Marxist writers if they had been collected in the right places."

German writers left their native homeland on a huge scale and regarded this as an expression of their political and moral protest.

Hans Mayer refers to this period as a special case in the "tragic history of literature."

For writers in centuries gone by had only been exiled for a limited period and were allowed to return after each flight.

As Brecht facetiously remarked, the Chinese lyricists and philosophers, for example, went into exile just like others "go to the academy."

Another great German 19th century writer, Heinrich Heine, maintained that "fleeing would be easy if we didn't have to drag our Vaterland around with us on the soles of our feet."

Thomas Mann took a different stance on the situation in exile:

"It is a strange experience," he commented in his diary during a period in which he gave a set of talks abroad, "to notice how your own country moves away from you when you are abroad, as if it will never return."

The German writers in exile wrote "with their faces towards Germany," however, no-one stood behind them.

"Why should foreigners be interested in us, if our own country isn't?" asks a German scholar in Bruno Frank's "exile" novel *Der Reisepass* (The Passport).

In his Californian exile, Heinrich Mann took stock of the situation:

In his book *Ein Zeitalter wird beschliffen* (Summing up an Era) he writes that "an era of suture propaganda" will leave

Continued on page 12



Wolfgang Reinbacher as Odón von Horvath and Andreas Weissert as Berthold Brecht in *Geschichten aus Hollywood*. (Photo: Lore Bernbach)

## British black humour and German literary refugees

Peter Hampton's play *Geschichten aus Hollywood* (Stories from Hollywood), which had its European premiere performance in Düsseldorf, is more than just another effort to re-appraise German history.

The subject-matter deals with the German intellectuals living in exile in America between 1938 and 1950.

However, the play, directed by Peter Pulitzsch, is not merely a (British) reminder of the 50th anniversary of Hitler's take-over in 1933.

Many of the *Geschichten* have a documentary character; others are pure fiction.

The author has successfully managed to blend both elements into an infectious and rousing "theatre within the theatre," full of British black humour.

Nobel prize winner Thomas Mann is seen earning his dully bread by giving talks throughout the USA, a man who can only follow his own (aesthetic) instinct and prefers to continue his work in *Lotte in Weimar* rather than become involved in decidedly political activities.

His brother, Heinrich Mann's reputation depended "on the legs of Marlene Dietrich" (The Blue Angel).

Bert Brecht and Odón von Horvath are forced to write idiotic film scripts to survive.

Heinrich Mann's wife Nelly is seen despairing in her isolation (a brilliant performance by Marianne Holka) and finally commits suicide.

Just a few of the scenes in Hampton's play.

Realities and "theatrical licence" diverge when the audience sees Brecht (Andreas Weissert), Thomas (Wolfgang Arps) and Heinrich Mann (Hans Schulze) meet again and again in Hollywood bars, film studios and during private parties.

In reality, the fundamental differences in their literary and philosophical attitudes meant that they didn't have all that much to say to one another and very rarely met.

Odón von Horvath (Wolfgang Reinbacher), who keeps the play going as a mixture of maître de plaisir, presenter and analyst, may well have found the grotesque world of Hollywood quite amusing, had he not in fact died in Paris in 1938 and not as in Hampton's play in a Californian swimming pool in 1950.

There is a constant change in the style of production, and Bert Brecht is "quoted" more than once.

For example, when the lights unexpectedly go on in the theatre — because (according to Brecht) the audience must never forget that it is sitting in the theatre.

Wolfgang Platzek  
(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 28 March 1983)







A special Bundestag commission has investigated the role of women journalists working for radio and television.

The analysis underlined the importance of showing the public how women journalists work, what their working conditions are like in an effort to do help more women enter journalism.

Although 52 per cent of the population are female, only 33 per cent of those entering journalism are women.

Only 17 per cent of the editors in print media and radio are women; five per cent of the editors-in-chief are; and no single daily newspaper has a woman in the top editorial position.

98.5 per cent of the commentators and foreign correspondents working for the ARD broadcasting channel are men. Even women's magazines such as the popular *Brigitte* are run by men.

Many women fall by the wayside in the struggle to get to the top.

In a study conducted by Irene Neverla, Gerda Kanzleiter and a number of other women from the University of Munich an effort is made to discover why.

The study deals with the situation of female journalists and is to be published soon.

You don't need to study or undergo any special kind of training to get into journalism.

This is a factor of uncertainty for many women, many of them just slipped to the job as it were.

Many mothers of women journalists have a university education and the fathers of many were self-employed. This is less the case with male journalists.

Many women get into journalism via freelance activities, this being the only way to combine their job and their private life — which usually means their family.

This is a particularly difficult task in this job as journalists are often required to work in the evening and must as it were be constantly available.

This would suggest why only 25 per cent of the women journalists have children compared with 57 per cent for their male colleagues; 30 per cent of female journalists live alone. These are statistics from a *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* (WDR) survey.

Forty two per cent of the women, as opposed to 72 per cent of men, state that they find it easy to combine their work and their family life.

Those women who manage to get a foot inside the journalistic door often get no further than the low-prestige departments, and are very rarely serious candidates for editors-in-chief.

The Neverla/Kanzleiter study reveals these employment statistics for the broadcasting channels ARD (excluding SR and SFB), ZDF and RIAS: female journalists for politics, economics, sport and current affairs, 9 per cent (TV, 8 per cent); for culture, education and social affairs, 26 per cent (TV, 11 per cent); for light entertainment and music, 13 per cent (TV, 16 per cent).

The daily newspaper on which research was carried out didn't have one female political journalist and, of the total of 18 women journalists, eight worked for the local and regional section.

Here, they are responsible for the traditional women's subjects, such as health, consumer questions, social issues, the church, culture and of course fashion.

Many had not chosen these fields themselves but had virtually been put there by their male colleagues.

One participant at a "Women in the

## SOCIETY

# Why women journalists find it hard to make the grade

Media seminar in Hagen characterised her male colleagues and the "mutual cooperation" as follows: "Getting the come-on, vanity, showing-off, jokes, alcohol, playing Skat (a popular German card game), broken-down relationships."

The study confirmed the male will to reach the top and the fear of success on the part of the women.

It would seem as if all the men are just waiting in their starting holes and raring to go.

Neverla/Kanzleiter and the other members of the research team gained the impression that men accept the price of success without thinking.

It was not clear whether women actually rejected such a career outright because success was too difficult or whether they are not willing to adjust and run the risk of being corrupted by success.

Of the 98 male and female journalists covered by the study, 75 per cent of the men and only 40 per cent of the women claimed to be interested in assuming top management functions.

"Women do not feel at ease in privileged positions."

Some of the participants at the Hagen conference then revealed a typical reaction: they regarded it as important for women to take on top jobs, but they did not like the idea of doing so themselves.

According to the Neverla/Kanzleiter report, if women want to be successful they have to overcome their subjective fears and also set aside the "clearly biologically influenced prejudice that there are specifically female capabilities."

According to one of the male colleagues interviewed, for example, women are "more subject to fluctuations in their abilities than men, that's quite understandable, obvious."

Others feel that women are "unobjective," "simply more sensitive," "don't get so involved in certain editorial tasks" and do not "have as much sly power" as men.

This is particularly the case when women are asked to "sacrifice their time."

One TV director commented: "A woman just isn't really suited for this TV business — you can quote me word-for-word here. A woman is just too involved in her own affairs. She is hardly able to form the editorial circles and teams needed. She wants to do everything herself."

The interviewer drew these conclusions from these opinions: "If women had the qualifications and capabilities then they would be able to get in to top positions."

"Such a formulation implies that women can usually be expected not to have such qualifications, whereas the latter are almost automatically expected for men."

If it really is so difficult for women in general to climb up the career ladder in this profession, you would expect the female "loners" to club together and try for greater success.

However, this is where we come across another difficulty: the relationship between the female journalists is not always marked by solidarity. Competition is fast to gain the upper hand.

Many of the participants at the seminar told tales of intrigue, gossip, "male" behaviour, urgence, envy and mistrust.

unlongside the many positive ones.

To really remain a woman supporting the women's movement, meeting many female journalists is most difficult.

In the Neverla/Kanzleiter study, male journalists were asked to give their opinions on the women's movement.

Most said that it was a good but that anti-male excesses and a dual way in which demands were made were too exaggerated. It's foreing men on to the defensive.

Although the women perceive themselves to be emotionally stronger, they would appear to share the responsibility for men with the network of "social partnership."

This dissociation from the movement would indicate a purely political movement.

Despite many excesses of experience made with other journalists, the participants at the seminar agreed that more women should come involved in journalism.

"People (men) have got to realise that we exist, so that there is a balance between official policies and everyday life can no longer be ignored."

It's about time that "subtle" dealt with from a woman's point of view. But the chances of success are however, pretty poor.

The percentage share of female journalists represented in three leading stations of differing sizes decreased between 1949 and 1979.

Although the number of female journalists increased, corresponding increases in the percentage share of women.

Any cut-backs in this field, hit the women first.

Barbel D... 11 Frankfurt Rundschau, 25 Nov.

circumstances like these have blackened the image of the Dortmund police to such an extent that businessmen now make a point of telling their employees to be careful of policemen, telling them that they are not prepared to take video sets and other goods to work.

Case three: A Dortmund citizen wanted to get rid of two tramps sleeping off in a nearly completed building. He was with a bucket of cold water. But the three policemen who were on the scene had a better idea.

"We'll take care of it," said one of them. He drew his chemical mace and the two tramps straight in the face. A doctor later diagnosed eye and face injuries.

Incidents like these have blackened the image of the Dortmund police to such an extent that businessmen now make a point of telling their employees to be careful of policemen, telling them that they are not prepared to take video sets and other goods to work.

After a burglary in a supermarket, the first thing the two officers who were called in to investigate did was to help themselves — one to a bottle of Greek brandy and the other to a bottle of vodka.

Asked what made them do it, one of the policemen answered: "It's customary. They hid the stolen bottles under their jackets because 'it wouldn't look so good to be seen running around with a bottle in hand.'"

One of the co-defendants, argued that they would have been given a bottle of alcohol anyway because that was the custom. So what was wrong with helping themselves?

The judges saw it differently and gave each of the accused an eight-month suspended sentence and a fine of DM2,000.

North Rhine-Westphalia's Interior Minister, Herbert Schnoor (SPD), said in a TV interview that "we must accept the fact that the change of values in our society as a whole, as with regard to property, has not passed by the police force." In an aside, he added: "What we need is a police force capable of acting on its own initiative."

He has exactly that — especially in Dortmund — though of course not the way he meant it. There can be no denying that Dortmund police officers showed initiative when, in their free time, drunk and without orders, they proceeded against the squatters in case two.

There was a whole group of them but only two had the misfortune of having been on so many official raids against squatters and demonstrators as to be instantly identified and subsequently charged: senior police officer Dietmar Weist, in charge of the central precinct, and Commissar Michael Murawski, deputy head of a task force.

They were given four-month suspended sentences. The judge accepted as a mitigating circumstance that they had had frequent brushes with squatters and used their raid to rid themselves of their frustrations.

The press officer at police headquarters now routinely lists the many disciplinary proceedings against the black sheep in the force. There are 17 formal disciplinary proceedings in progress against alleged police thieves and fences.

Some have had their salaries cut to up to 40 per cent, and the three police officers who used their chemical mace on the tramps have been suspended from duty pending the appeal of their court sentences.

One officer who, last December, came under suspicion of pimping and is now being tried has been suspended from duty on full pay.

Only officers Weist and Murawski are still on full duty. Weist lost his position as head of the central precinct. But Murawski is still deputy head of his task force because it appears that Police President Wolfgang Manner cannot manage without him.

Only ten days after the attack on the squatters and long before the wounds of the injured had healed, Murawski was put in charge of security for a major soccer game.

Commented Manner in his local press: "There's nobody else of his calibre."

Ingrid Müller-Münch (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 March 1983)

**Shooting deaths: should officers be armed?**

A 14-year-old boy was recently shot dead by police after he had forced his way at night into a youth centre in Gauting, Bavaria.

The incident was so grotesque that it is impossible to give the police the benefit of the doubt.

There was nothing that could even remotely have resembled a self-defence reaction.

Even if the boy had been a real criminal, he was in an enclosed space. All the police had to do was to wait for him to come out again or summon help.

And even if the boy had been hailed by the police (why wasn't he?) and had not responded, there was no reason to shoot.

And if he had started to cause trouble inside the building, there would still have been no reason to shoot.

The shooting had to be done through a window, making it impossible to aim to incapacitate rather than kill.

There have been more such macabre examples of unwarranted use of police weapons.

In Hamburg, on 18-year-old youth who could at most have been suspected of being a car thief was shot dead at point-blank range after he had already been arrested. And in Augsburg the indiscriminate use of weapons led to the death of a drunk driver.

What these incidents have in common is the fact that the use of the weapon was out of proportion to the "crime" and had nothing to do with self-defence.

What happened was that the pistol simply overcompensated for its user's helplessness.

There are those who will point to the inadequate training of young police officers and to unclear regulations on the use of arms.

But even should there be a kernel of truth in such arguments, they miss the core of the problem: it is simply impossible to arm a huge number of policemen and expect them all to show a sense of responsibility.

This is not directed against individual police officers but is meant to point to the fact that the very law of averages such a system must lead to deadly mistakes.

Before going into the pros and cons in the controversy over the justification to "shoot to kill," experience shows that we should weigh the necessity of having an armed police force as against the possibility of a "controlled disarmament move."

Robert Leich (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 March 1983)

THE LAW

Lock your doors folks, here comes the Dortmund police force

Police in Dortmund have developed an unenviable reputation for corruption. Policemen at all levels have been involved in crime.

Case one: The radio at police headquarters crackled: "We've arrived at the scene of the burglary. Send a van."

The squad at the burgled Dortmund electronics shop was too late to catch burglars who fled, leaving the stolen goods — radios, stereo sets, video recorders and TV sets — on the loading bay.

When the extra men arrived in the van they were told to push off again. They left the van because the policeman on the scene would like to watch for any burglars who might have been behind.

Once rid of their colleagues, they hid the van with the haul and took it to a safe place: home.

Case two: A handful of off-duty Dortmund policemen in plain clothes entered a house occupied by squatters and started beating up everybody. They were pulled by their hair, men were pushed down the stairs and a visiting policeman injured to the point where he was hospitalised for weeks.

The crews of several patrol cars culled by the neighbours lingered for a long time and then drove off again.

Case three: A Dortmund citizen wanted to get rid of two tramps sleeping off in a nearly completed building. He was with a bucket of cold water. But the three policemen who were on the scene had a better idea.

"We'll take care of it," said one of them. He drew his chemical mace and the two tramps straight in the face. A doctor later diagnosed eye and face injuries.

Incidents like these have blackened the image of the Dortmund police to such an extent that businessmen now make a point of telling their employees to be careful of policemen, telling them that they are not prepared to take video sets and other goods to work.

After a burglary in a supermarket, the first thing the two officers who were called in to investigate did was to help themselves — one to a bottle of Greek brandy and the other to a bottle of vodka.

Asked what made them do it, one of the policemen answered: "It's customary. They hid the stolen bottles under their jackets because 'it wouldn't look so good to be seen running around with a bottle in hand.'"

One of the co-defendants, argued that they would have been given a bottle of alcohol anyway because that was the custom. So what was wrong with helping themselves?

The judges saw it differently and gave each of the accused an eight-month suspended sentence and a fine of DM2,000.

North Rhine-Westphalia's Interior Minister, Herbert Schnoor (SPD), said in a TV interview that "we must accept the fact that the change of values in our society as a whole, as with regard to property, has not passed by the police force." In an aside, he added: "What we need is a police force capable of acting on its own initiative."

He has exactly that — especially in Dortmund — though of course not the way he meant it. There can be no denying that Dortmund police officers showed initiative when, in their free time, drunk and without orders, they proceeded against the squatters in case two.

There was a whole group of them but only two had the misfortune of having been on so many official raids against squatters and demonstrators as to be instantly identified and subsequently charged: senior police officer Dietmar Weist, in charge of the central precinct, and Commissar Michael Murawski, deputy head of a task force.

They were given four-month suspended sentences. The judge accepted as a mitigating circumstance that they had had frequent brushes with squatters and used their raid to rid themselves of their frustrations.

The press officer at police headquarters now routinely lists the many disciplinary proceedings against the black sheep in the force. There are 17 formal disciplinary proceedings in progress against alleged police thieves and fences.

Some have had their salaries cut to up to 40 per cent, and the three police officers who used their chemical mace on the tramps have been suspended from duty pending the appeal of their court sentences.

One officer who, last December, came under suspicion of pimping and is now being tried has been suspended from duty on full pay.

Only officers Weist and Murawski are still on full duty. Weist lost his position as head of the central precinct. But Murawski is still deputy head of his task force because it appears that Police President Wolfgang Manner cannot manage without him.

Only ten days after the attack on the squatters and long before the wounds of the injured had healed, Murawski was put in charge of security for a major soccer game.

Commented Manner in his local press: "There's nobody else of his calibre."

Ingrid Müller-Münch (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 March 1983)

**Moscow and missiles**

Continued from page 2

would seem inevitable in such an eventuality, the Soviets will be disappointed, just as they were with the outcome of the West German elections in March.

It would hardly be surprising if they are banking on a Democrat victory during the US elections in 1984.

Yet again, they may have to hide their disappointment. And, in the final analysis, if they take their own military arguments seriously they must soon answer the question whether they would prefer 54 or 27 or no Pershings to 108 — and if so, how many SS-20s they would be willing to "sacrifice" to reach such an agreement.

In this sense, the argument that the closer the date of deployment gets, the greater the willingness of the Soviets to compromise will become is indeed correct.

This compromise, however, must be achieved soon after the Geneva talks reconvene at the end of May.

This presupposes that the Western concepts have taken clear shape by then and that negotiations keep moving between spring and late autumn.

It will be virtually impossible to obtain concessions from the Russians if the Pershings are already part of the landscape.

This would trigger off the "hour of the counter measures" — the crisis hour, which nobody dare desire.

Theo Sommer (Die Zeit, 8 April 1983)

Robert Leich (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 March 1983)